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Attacking Without Provocation; Maintaining a 
Subsequent Occupation; All for the Sake of 
Democratization: The Constitutionality and Wisdom 
of Preventive War and Post-Conflict Nation-Building 
Kevin Green  
Today, the United States has at its disposal a vast range of tools 
for military intervention.
1
 These tools span a wide spectrum, ranging 
from shipment of arms or military advisers to full, direct military 
intervention.
2
 The Bush Doctrine
3
 has not expanded the kinds of tools 
 
  J.D., cum laude (2009), Washington University School of Law; B.A., summa cum 
laude (2006), Loyola University Chicago. Special thanks to Jamie Rehmann, the entire Journal 
of Law & Policy staff, and of course my friends and family for their constant support. 
 1. In ANDREW BENNETT, CONDEMNED TO REPETITION? THE RISE, FALL, AND REPRISE 
OF SOVIET-RUSSIAN MILITARY INTERVENTIONISM, 1973–1996 (1999), the author defines 
military intervention as ―the use of force in an intrastate or interstate conflict of a foreign 
country with the objective of influencing the makeup, policies, stability, or strength of the 
regime in that country.‖ Id. at 14. Bennett also distinguishes military intervention from war, 
stating that ―in military interventions, there is a regime or at least a powerful faction aligned 
with the intervening power; otherwise, the use of force takes on the character of an interstate 
war.‖ Id. In today‘s world, U.S. intervention likely will include some other faction aligned with 
its interests in intervening, whether it is the United Nations, NATO, a ―coalition of the willing,‖ 
or a powerful religious faction within the invaded nation. It seems that a distinction between 
military intervention and interstate war should not depend upon whether the intervening nation 
has support from another group or groups. Accordingly, this Note adopts Bennett‘s definition of 
―military intervention‖ to also apply to what he calls ―war.‖ That is, in this Note, the term 
―military intervention‖ includes direct military intervention in which the intervening nation 
goes alone into another nation without any outside support or allies.  
 2. In analyzing Soviet use of military intervention, Bennett lists different dimensions of 
military intervention by increasing risk of commitment: (1) shipment of arms to client regimes; 
(2) transport of other nation‘s troops to or in a client regime; (3) direct supply of other nation‘s 
troops on the front; (4) deployment of military advisors in the war zone; (5) military aid to 
allied troops; (6) use of a nation‘s own troops in combat roles; (7) use of a nation‘s military 
commanders to direct a large-scale intervention; and (8) use of a nation‘s own ground troops. 
Id. at 15. Although this list is not exhaustive, it demonstrates the wide range of military tools a 
nation has at its disposal for military intervention. 
 3. The Bush Doctrine asserts ―the right to use force preemptively against any country or 
terrorist group that could potentially threaten U.S. security.‖ Richard N. Gardner, Neither Bush 
nor the ―Jurisprudes,‖ 97 AM. J. INT‘L L. 585, 585 (2003). 
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available. Rather, it has reconfigured the way in which they are used 
to include preventive strikes.
4
 Furthermore, although President 
George W. Bush strictly opposed nation-building during his 2000 
campaign,
5
 he maintained troop levels abroad in post-conflict efforts 
to rebuild invaded nations.
6
 Even with the advent of a new 
administration, this policy has not changed. Thus, the current warfare 
policy of the United States includes two major components—
preventive military action and post-conflict nation-building. 
These facets of military intervention raise significant 
constitutional and policy questions that must be addressed to assess 
whether the United States is properly utilizing its military resources 
to best serve the nation and the world. Current scholarship on the 
constitutionality of preventive war and post-conflict nation-building 
is nearly non-existent, and the policy debate has not yet considered 
the two facets of modern warfare together. This Note examines the 
constitutionality and wisdom of both aspects of the current warfare 
policy. Ultimately, the current United States warfare strategy that 
includes using preventive wars followed by post-conflict military 
nation-building is constitutional; however, underlying policy 
concerns suggest that this approach to warfare should be reconsidered 
and reframed. 
Part I of this Note examines the current warfare policy of the 
United States. It first shows the origins of the policy of preventive 
war and then explains the distinction between preemptive and 
preventive war. Next, it defines post-conflict nation-building, reveals 
an American attitude of nation-building through an historical 
analysis, and examines modern efforts of nation-building. Finally, it 
 
 4. See, e.g., Press Release, George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America 6 (Sept. 17, 2002). 
 5. For example, in a 2000 Presidential Debate between George W. Bush and Vice 
President Al Gore, Mr. Bush explained: 
The vice president and I have a disagreement about the use of troops. He believes in 
nation building. I would be very careful about using our troops as nation builders. I 
believe the role of the military is to fight and win war and therefore prevent war from 
happening in the first place. 
George W. Bush, First Gore-Bush Presidential Debate (Oct. 3, 2000) (transcript available at 
http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2000a.html). 
 6. The President has not simply maintained, but increased the number of troops (―the 
surge‖). George W. Bush, President‘s Address to the Nation (Jan. 10, 2007). 
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discusses other scholarship on the constitutionality of the current 
warfare policy.  
Part II analyzes the constitutionality of the current warfare policy 
and finds that preventive war with post-conflict nation-building is 
constitutional. Part III examines the wisdom of this warfare policy 
and concludes that preventive war is not a sound policy, but post-
conflict nation-building is. 
Part IV proposes an American warfare policy for the twenty-first 
century that utilizes means other than preventive war. It also 
advocates a restructuring of military and political institutions to 
ensure adequate nation-building efforts after future conflicts have 
ended. 
I. THE CURRENT WARFARE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United 
States significantly modified its national security policy to include 
preventive military attacks.
7
 Today, the United States military is 
involved in an effort to rebuild a nation it invaded under this policy 
of prevention.
8
 Accordingly, the current American warfare policy 
includes both preventive wars and post-conflict nation-building. 
A. Preventive War 
One of the most controversial changes to America‘s national 
security strategy was the utilization of preventive strikes as a means 
of self-defense.
9
 Although the United States has considered and 
carried out first strikes against security threats in the past,
10
 the Bush 
Doctrine overtly emphasized prevention as a strategy, marking an 
unprecedented shift in American national security policy.
11
  
 
 7. KARL P. MUELLER ET AL., STRIKING FIRST: PREEMPTIVE AND PREVENTIVE ATTACK IN 
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 2 (2006). 
 8. See Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Rebuilding Iraq (Dec. 7, 2005) 
(―Over the course of this war, the Coalition has learned that winning the battle for Iraqi cities is 
only a first step. The Coalition has adjusted to win the ‗battle after the battle‘ by helping Iraqis 
consolidate their gains and keep the terrorists from returning.‖). 
 9. Bush, supra note 4, at 13–16. 
 10. MUELLER ET AL., supra note 7, at 2. 
 11. Id. 
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1. Distinguishing Preemption from Prevention 
Although the National Security Strategy and other policy 
statements use the word ―preemption‖ to refer to a first strike against 
a perceived security threat,
12
 ―generations of historians, social 
scientists, legal scholars, and policymakers have defined preemption 
more restrictively, distinguishing preemptive from preventive 
attack.‖13 Essentially, a preemptive attack is one launched because of 
an expectation that ―the adversary is about to attack, and that striking 
first will be better than being attacked.‖14 Generally, a true 
preemptive attack must involve an imminent threat.
15
 
On the other hand, preventive attacks involve responses to less 
immediate threats.
16
 Thus, preventive attacks are motivated ―not by 
the desire to strike first rather than second, but by the desire to fight 
sooner rather than later.‖17 In these situations, trying to assess long-
term threats involves forecasting the capabilities of the opponent that 
will exist in the future—a task that naturally involves much 
 
 12. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 4, at 6, 15, 16. 
 13. MUELLER ET AL., supra note 7, at 6. 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. at 6–7; see also JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY 
OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 415 (2004) (defining ―preemptive attack‖ as ―[a]n 
attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent‖). 
 16. MUELLER ET AL., supra note 7, at 8; see also JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 15, 
at 419 (defining ―preventive war‖ as ―[a] war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while 
not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risks.‖). 
 17. MUELLER ET AL., supra note 7, at 8. A state may not prefer to delay fighting for 
numerous reasons: 
The most obvious one is when the balance of military capabilities between the 
adversaries is shifting, or is expected to shift in the enemy‘s favor, because of 
differential rates of growth, development, or armament; fear that the opponent will 
acquire or develop nuclear weapons or some other new offensive or defensive 
capability that will fundamentally alter the correlation of forces is a variation on this 
theme of particular salience today . . . . Anticipating unfavorable shifts in the 
allegiance or capabilities of allies can produce similar incentives for preventive war. 
Fighting sooner rather than later may appear to offer the prospect of winning instead of 
losing, or it may serve merely to make fighting less costly or to delay the emergence of 
a more serious threat. 
Id. at 8–9. For an historical example of why a nation may want to go to war but choose not to, 
see JOHN G. STOESSINGER, HENRY KISSINGER: THE ANGUISH OF POWER 179 (1976); Simcha 
Dinitz, The Yom Kippur War: Diplomacy of War and Peace, in REVISITING THE YOM KIPPUR 
WAR 104, 108 (P. R. Kumaraswamy ed., 2000). 
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uncertainty—and using general trends from the past to estimate the 
opponent‘s future intentions.18  
This distinction may seem like an excursion into semantics, but it 
is important because of its legal perceptions and consequences. 
Accordingly, ―[m]any scholars contend that the boundary between 
preemption and prevention is also the threshold separating wars of 
opportunity from wars of necessity, and therefore legitimate from 
illegitimate use of force.‖19  
B. Post-Conflict Nation-Building 
Besides permitting the use of preventive war, the current warfare 
policy of the United States also includes post-conflict nation-
building.
20
 The current state of American warfare policy and the push 
for ―democratization‖21 abroad has implied that America does not 
simply fight wars; it rebuilds nations when the battle has ended.
22
 
 
 18. MUELLER ET AL., supra note 7, at 10. This differs from the assessment involved in 
preemptive strikes, where estimating current military capabilities is fairly straightforward 
because they already exist, and the more difficult assessment is whether the opponent will 
attack since preparations for attack do not always mean an actual commitment to attack. Id. at 9. 
The war in Iraq, which was predicated on eliminating the threat that Iraq would directly or 
indirectly attack the United States or its allies in the future if it were not attacked first, was 
preventive under this analysis. Id. at 15. The war in Afghanistan, however, was neither 
preemptive nor preventive because it was a response to hostilities initiated by the adversary. Id. 
Still, the war in Afghanistan could be said to have been operationally preemptive as one of its 
objectives was to eliminate al-Queda‘s Afghan base of operations before additional terrorist 
attacks could be launched from it. Id. 
 19. Id. at 22. Additionally, ―the international community has traditionally considered 
preemption to be a potentially legitimate form of self-defense while viewing most prevention as 
illegitimate aggression.‖ Id. at 19. 
 20. On May 1, 2003, President Bush declared the end of major combat operations in Iraq. 
George W. Bush, Remarks by the President from the USS Abraham Lincoln at Sea Off the 
Coast of San Diego, California (May 1, 2003). On January 10, 2007, President Bush announced 
an increase in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq to bolster security, train the Iraqi army, increase 
the number of provincial reconstruction teams, bring together military and civilian experts to 
help Iraqi communities pursue reconciliation, strengthen the moderates, speed the transition of 
Iraqi self-reliance, and ensure better results for economic assistance being spent in Iraq. Bush, 
supra note 6.  
 21. Democratization is not a new concept for America. See James Kurth, Ignoring 
History: U.S. Democratization in the Muslim World, 49 ORBIS 305, 306 (2005) (―The twentieth 
century witnessed numerous attempts to bring democracy to countries that hitherto had been 
ruled by authoritarian regimes. The great majority of these efforts were promoted by the United 
States, and many of them were backed by U.S. military intervention and occupation.‖).  
 22. See, e.g., George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
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Thus, the current warfare policy cannot fully be examined without 
accounting for post-conflict nation-building.  
1. Defining ―Nation-Building‖ 
Nation-building refers to the actions undertaken, after major 
combat operations have ended, to restore structure by means of 
institutions and security so that the nation may successfully operate 
on its own.
23
 Throughout history, the term ―nation building‖ has 
taken on different meanings.
24
 Today, however, ―nation building 
normally implies the attempt to create democratic and secure 
states.‖25 Accordingly, ―democratization efforts are part of the larger 
and more comprehensive nation-building campaign.‖26 
2. An American Attitude of Nation-Building 
Military nation-building has been at the heart of American warfare 
since the founding of the country, arising out of colonial 
 
America 33 (Mar. 16, 2006). Chapter VII explains that the United States will engage in 
―[t]ransformational [d]iplomacy and [e]ffective [d]emocracy,‖ which means that it will work 
―to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their 
citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. Long-term 
development must include encouraging governments to make wise choices and assisting them 
in implementing those choices.‖ Id. The United States ―will encourage and reward good 
behavior rather than reinforce negative behavior.‖ Id. If this is to be true, then the United States 
must remain in a country after it has fought a war in order to rebuild the country and sustain a 
democratic, well-governed state. 
 23. A recent Congressional Research Service issue brief explains: 
[N]ation-building is not a precise term, but rather one that is used for both a concept 
and a variety of activities. On one level, nation-building is used to refer to the concept 
of creating (or a decision to create) a democratic state, often in a post-conflict 
situation. The term is also used, however, to refer to any of the range of activities that 
militaries or civilians undertake to advance that goal. 
NINA M. SERAFINO, PEACEKEEPING AND RELATED STABILITY OPERATIONS: ISSUES OF U.S. 
MILITARY INVOLVEMENT, CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS IB94040, at 6 (Mar. 27, 2006), 
available at http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/IB94040.pdf. 
 24. Nation building ―has over the years signified an effort to construct a government that 
may or may not be democratic, but preferably is stable.‖ Karin von Hippel, Democracy by 
Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation Building, 23 WASH. Q. 95, 96 (2000). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/15
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  All for the Sake of Democratization 515 
 
 
independence and the subsequent territorial expansion.
27
 Less than 
one hundred years after the United States gained its independence, 
America went from thirteen colonies to the continental United 
States.
28
  
An interventionist impulse developed during this time that 
―worked from the premise of nation-building,‖ and was built on the 
idea that the United States ―was a nation with a privileged history.‖29 
 
 27. Throughout the early history of the United States, seven key turning points created an 
interventionist spirit in America. Dr. Peter J. Schraeder, Lecture: The Evolution of the 
Interventionist Impulse (Sept. 06, 2004) [hereinafter Schraeder Lecture]; see also Lloyd C. 
Gardner, The Evolution of the Interventionist Impulse, in INTERVENTION IN THE 1990‘S (Peter 
Schraeder 2d ed., 1992). The birth of the nation left Americans with a revolutionary spirit and 
the idea that America always had the best ideas. Schraeder Lecture, supra. The universality of 
the American cause led to a desire to spread America‘s ideas around the world. Id. In other 
countries that were born out of revolutions, such as France and Russia, this spirit was soon 
extinguished by their neighbors who did not want revolution seeping across their borders. 
Gardner, supra, at 27. Because of America‘s geography, however, it had no powerful nations 
bordering it and thus, the revolutionary spirit was able to remain alive and expand far beyond 
the original thirteen colonies. Id. Out of this revolutionary zeal came a pioneer spirit that lead to 
continental expansion. Schraeder Lecture, supra.  
 28. By 1783, the original thirteen colonies had increased their size by almost three times 
when Britain ceded the land south of Canada from the Atlantic west to the Mississippi River. 
Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. II, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 81. In 1803, the land size 
doubled again with the Louisiana Purchase from France. Robert Knowles, The Balance of 
Forces and the Empire of Liberty: States’ Rights and the Louisiana Purchase, 88 IOWA L. REV. 
343, 345 (2003). At this point in history, it seemed as though America was forming an empire, 
if not by conquest, by purchase. Michael Kent Curtis, The Court and the Empire, 20 CONST. 
COMMENT. 163, 164 (2003) (reviewing JAMES G. WILSON, THE IMPERIAL REPUBLIC: A 
STRUCTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE 
BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2002)). Florida was purchased in 1819. Treaty of 
Amity, Settlement, and Limits, U.S.-Spain, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252. Texas entered the Union 
in 1845. Joint Resolution for Annexing Texas to the United States, J. Res. 8, 28th Cong., 5 Stat. 
797, 798 (2d Sess. 1845). Oregon was added from Britain in 1846. Treaty with Great Britain, 
U.S.-Gr. Brit., June 15, 1846, 9 Stat. 869. The Mexican-American War added the California 
territory in 1848. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of 
Mexico, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922. Additionally, the area just above the Rio Grande 
was purchased from Mexico in 1853. Gadsden Purchase Treaty, U.S.-Mex., Dec. 30, 1853, 10 
Stat. 1031. In fact, until the Civil War in 1861, ―the nation‘s foreign affairs had encompassed a 
single general principle: the steady absorption of all the neighboring territory. The ease of 
expansion had permitted Americans to carry forward the revolution while maintaining a loose 
and separately responsible division of government.‖ Gardner, supra note 27, at 28. For a map 
depicting the territorial expansion of the United States, see Territorial Acquisitions of the 
United States, http://www.nationalatlas.gov/printable/territorialacquisition.html (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2009). For a discussion of the square mileage of America‘s territorial expansion, see Jan 
G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation on Public Lands, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 140, 148 
n.18 (1999).  
 29. Gardner, supra note 27, at 34. 
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In a short time, Americans had seen the nation progress ―across the 
North American continent largely uncontested, brushing aside 
overextended European empires, opening up the prairies and 
interning the remnants of Indian nations, and swooping up vast 
mineral resources as they went along—finally, to make of the nation 
a land rich beyond previous human experience.‖30 United States 
territory increased in size with such ease
31
 that a new world-view 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. In 1823, the Monroe Doctrine declared that ―henceforth the Western Hemisphere was 
closed to European colonization and that European states must refrain from intervening in Latin 
American affairs.‖ Id. at 27. After the Monroe Doctrine was announced, ―the legend grew that 
the United States had put an end to European intriguing in the Western Hemisphere and had 
intervened successfully in world politics to protect democracy against repression.‖ Id. During 
this time, Manifest Destiny gave the perception of a God-given right and duty to expand. See, 
e.g., John L. O‘Sullivan, The Great Nation of Futurity, 6 U.S. DEMOCRATIC REV. 426, 430 
(1839) (―[T]his will be our future history, to establish on earth the moral dignity and salvation 
of man . . . . For this blessed mission to the nations of the world, which are shut out from the 
life-giving light of truth, has America been chosen . . . .‖). In 1898 the Spanish-American War 
began and it became clear that America would be a world superpower. See Gardner, supra note 
27, at 29; Jan Nijman, The Limits of Superpower: The United States and the Soviet Union Since 
World War II, 82 ANNALS ASS‘N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 681, 684 (1992) (explaining that great 
powers are defined ―in terms of ‗global reach,‘ ‗control of worldwide networks,‘ ‗global 
projection of power,‘ ‗control of territory,‘ ‗size of spheres of influence,‘ and so on.‖). During 
this time, America expanded beyond the Western Hemisphere. Gardner, supra note 27, at 29. 
Cuba, the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico were the first colonies taken by the ever-
increasing American Empire. Id.  
 In the period between the Spanish-American War and the Great Depression, ―the United 
States embarked on an ambitious attempt at ‗progressive‘ imperialism in the Caribbean, Central 
America, and the Pacific.‖ Max Boot, Neither New nor Nefarious: The Liberal Empire Strikes 
Back, 102 CURRENT HIST. 361, 362 (2003). Administrations acted for a variety of concerns 
including: strategic reasons (Panama Canal), economic reasons (China), and ―The White Man‘s 
Burden‖ (Philippine Islands). Id. Additionally, the United States occupied a number of places 
temporarily: the Panama Canal Zone, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and the 
Mexican city of Veracruz. Id. ―The duration of occupation ranged from seven months (in 
Veracruz) to almost a century (in the Canal Zone).‖ Id.  
 After the World Wars, the United States emerged as a world superpower, competing only 
with the Soviet Union. See J.C. Hurewitz, Origins of the Rivalry, 29 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. 1, 1 
(1969). With Europe largely devastated, the superpowers ―became entrapped on opposing sides 
in interlocking regional disputes,‖ and ―were engaged . . . in rivalry for prestige, position, and 
influence.‖ Id. From this emergence of two superpowers came the Cold War and the first 
globalized Manifest Destiny. See Roberta L. Coles, Manifest Destiny Adapted for 1990s’ War 
Discourse: Mission and Destiny Intertwined, 63 SOC. RELIGION 403, 405 (2002) (―[W]hile 
Manifest Destiny is an enduring myth, it may be changing to suit the globalizing world 
economy.‖). After World War II, the United States inherited ―the fruits of a fallen Europe-
centric system that had been dominant in international affairs since the sixteenth century, [and 
policy-makers] perceived the Soviet Union as a distinctive challenge to U.S. goals in the 
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developed within America.
32
 As opposed to Europe, which generally 
believed in generational change, Americans came to believe that they 
could bring about change quickly—in a matter of years—both at 
home and abroad.
33
  
Thus, out of the remnants of this nation‘s own revolution came a 
pioneer spirit and an interventionist impulse driven by a belief that 
change could occur quickly.
34
 Through the years, enacting this 
change came to be viewed as the United States‘ right and duty.35 
Consequently, Americans tend to believe that if America is to 
intervene militarily in another nation, it cannot simply send troops in, 
destroy the other nation, and leave that nation to pick up the pieces.
36
 
 
postwar world.‖ Gardner, supra note 27, at 33. Moreover, with the atomic bomb, the United 
States again felt the frontier-days legend of ease of conquest. Id. at 35.  
 With the attacks of September 11, 2001, came the war on terror and the second 
globalization of Manifest Destiny. See Boot, supra, at 365. After 9/11, national security became 
a reason for the United States to become involved abroad. Id. (―We can only wonder what 
might have happened if, after the Soviet Union was driven out in the early 1990s, the United 
States had helped build Afghanistan into a viable state.‖). 
 It thus became the policy of the United States to not only do battle with existing terrorists, 
but also to prevent the development of new terrorist organizations by spreading democracy. See 
Bush, supra note 4, at v (―[T]he United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the 
benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, 
development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.‖).  
 32. Schraeder Lecture, supra note 27. 
 33. Id. This attitude helps explain why the United States was involved in over 160 
military interventions before World War II.
 
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON INT‘L REL., 94TH CONG., 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE USE OF U.S. ARMED FORCES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES, 
1975 REVISION 58–65 (Comm. Print 1975). Additionally, even after the fiasco of Vietnam, 
while the country suffered from ―Vietnam Syndrome,‖ the United States military was involved 
in over fifteen interventions. See James Meernik, United States Military Intervention and the 
Promotion of Democracy, 33 J. PEACE RES. 391, 395 (1996) (this list does not include more 
recent interventions such as Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq). 
 34. Gardner, supra note 27, at 34. 
 35. See, e.g., George W. Bush, Remarks by President Bush to the U.S. University 
Presidents Summit on International Education (Jan. 5, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
r/summit/58734.htm (―[F]reedom is the ideology that wins . . . . But you can‘t win in the long 
run for democracy unless you‘ve got the capacity to help spread democracy.‖). 
 36. Nation-building tasks are often viewed as essential to stabilize post-conflict situations 
because they provide the infrastructure that populations need to help re-establish normal lives. 
See Serafino, supra note 23, at 7 (―Such activities are also viewed as enhancing the legitimacy 
and extending the presence of weak central governments as they try to assert control in such 
situations, and as reassuring local populations of the friendly intent of foreign military forces.‖). 
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3. The Development of the Current Nation-Building Policy 
Throughout history, the United States military has engaged in 
nation-building efforts both at home and abroad after combat has 
ended in order to stabilize war-torn regions.
37
 Modern exercises in 
nation-building have included excursions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, 
and Kosovo.
38
 After September 11, 2001, however, the American 
 
 37. For example, after the American Civil War ended, Union soldiers remained in some 
areas of the South for nearly a decade ―to force the will of the victor on a conquered people‖ by 
enforcing the reconstruction laws with martial law. Ralph H. Gabriel, American Experience 
with Military Government, 49 AM. HIST. REV. 630, 639 (1944). When World War II ended, 
Allied soldiers remained in Germany and Japan for nearly eight years. William Rosenau, Non-
Traditional Missions and the Future of the U.S. Military, 18 FLETCHER FOREIGN WORLD AFF. 
31, 46 (1994). This occupation involved as many as 1.6 million U.S. troops in the European 
theater alone. Matthew Levinger, Nation-Building Demands Heavy Lifting, HIST. NEWS 
SERVICE, Aug. 17, 2004, http://www.h-net.org/~hns/articles/2004/081704b.html. 
 Vietnam saw the United States attempt to build and sustain an independent nation. See 
Michael R. Belknap, The Warren Court and the Vietnam War: The Limits of Legal Liberalism, 
33 GA. L. REV. 65, 105 (1998). This is not often counted as an instance of nation-building 
because it is viewed as a ―prolonged effort to create an entirely new nation in Southeast Asia . . 
. [and is] deemed ‗too short‘ and ‗too limited‘ in its political objectives to warrant study.‖ Marc 
Jason Gilbert, Fatal Amnesia: American Nation-Building in Viet Nam, Afghanistan and Iraq, 21 
J. THIRD WORLD STUD. 13, 14 (2004). Nonetheless, for two years, the United States reduced 
the number of military personnel in Vietnam while providing funds for the South Vietnamese 
forces. Melvin R. Laird, Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 26 
(2005). During those two years, ―South Vietnam held its own courageously and respectably 
against a better-bankrolled enemy.‖ Id. It was not until the United States stopped funding the 
South Vietnamese that they were overrun by the North. Id. 
 38. Although these nation-building interventions all lacked a major ground war stage by 
the United States, they nonetheless taught valuable lessons about nation-building. See JAMES 
DOBBINS ET AL., AMERICA‘S ROLE IN NATION-BUILDING: FROM GERMANY TO IRAQ (2003). 
Somalia taught that the objectives of a nation-building exercise should be scaled to available 
forces, resources, and staying power; that military forces needed to be complemented by civil 
capabilities for law enforcement, economic reconstruction, and political development; and that 
there can be no economic or political development without security. Id. at 69. 
 Nation-building efforts in Haiti taught that short departure deadlines and exit strategies 
diminished the prospects for enduring transformation. Id. at 84. Haiti also revealed that grossly 
ineffective government needs to be reformed before reconstruction programs can be successful. 
Id. 
 From Bosnia, the United States learned the importance of unity of command for the civil 
aspects of peace operation. Id. at 107. Furthermore, elections are now seen as an important 
benchmark in progress towards democracy, and if elections were held too early, they could 
strengthen opposition forces rather than promote further transformation. Id. Moreover, the 
difficulty of putting a nation back together when its neighbors are pulling it apart became 
painfully clear. Id.  
 Finally, Kosovo showed that broad participation, extensive burden-sharing, unity of 
command, and effective United States leadership could be compatible. Id. at 126. Still, 
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attitude towards nation-building came into line with the emerging 
notion of preventive war.
39
 That is, Americans sought aggressive 
reconstruction of nations for the sake of preventing future conflicts.
40
 
The attitude developed that nation building ―is not an epithet or a 
slogan. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, it is our duty.‖41 
Moreover, this duty did not arise from a notion of goodwill towards 
others; rather, it developed from a heightened sense of strategic 
interests and national security.
42
 
Thus, the War on Terror began an aggressive military policy 
abroad with the goal of stopping terrorists before they came to 
America.
43
 To achieve this goal, America initiated a warfare policy 
that allowed preventive war in order to fight on America‘s terms and 
timeline combined with a commitment to rebuild weak and war-torn 
nations for the sake of national defense.
44
 
 
uncertainty over final international status showed to be a hindrance to democratic transition, 
and slow mobilization of civil elements in peace operations was costly. Id. at 126–27. 
Ultimately, Kosovo demonstrated that when countries lack effective governmental institutions, 
placing expatriate staff in positions of authority can facilitate economic policy-making and 
implementation quite well. Id. at 127.  
 39. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 4, at v (―[A]s a matter of common sense and self-defense, 
America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. We cannot defend 
America and our friends by hoping for the best.‖). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Laird, supra note 37, at 32. 
 42. American philosopher and political economist Francis Fukuyama explained: 
The fact is that the chief threats to us and to world order come today from weak, 
collapsed, or failed states. Weak or absent government institutions in developing 
countries form the thread linking terrorism, refugees, AIDS, and global poverty. 
Before 9/11 the United States felt it could safely ignore chaos in a far-off place like 
Afghanistan; but the intersection of religious terrorism and weapons of mass 
destruction has meant that formerly peripheral areas are now of central concern. 
Francis Fukuyama, Nation-Building 101, 293 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 159, 159 (2004).  
 43. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 22, at ii (―[W]e must maintain and expand our national 
strength so we can deal with threats and challenges before they can damage our people or our 
interests.‖). 
 44. President Bush explained: 
The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can 
pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make 
poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and 
corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels 
within their borders. 
Bush, supra note 4, at v.  
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CURRENT WARFARE POLICY 
All powers of the government flow from the Constitution.
45
 As 
Justice Black explained, ―The United States is entirely a creature of 
the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can 
only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the 
Constitution.‖46 Thus, before a policy judgment can be made on the 
wisdom of waging preventive war and rebuilding nations after war, 
the constitutionality of such a policy must be addressed.  
A. Scholarship Addressing the Constitutionality of the Current 
American Warfare Policy 
Little scholarship exists on the issue of whether the government 
has the constitutional power to wage preventive war or use the 
military to rebuild war-torn nations.
47
 In his article, ―Preemptive 
 
 45. David Gray Adler, George Bush and the Abuse of History: The Constitution and 
Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs, 12 UCLA J. INT‘L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 75, 142 (2007). 
 46. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957); see also Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 
2, 136–37 (1866) (―[N]o department of the government of the United States—neither President, 
nor Congress, nor the Courts—possesses any power not given by the Constitution.‖); Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (―[A] law repugnant to the constitution is void; 
and . . . courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.‖); Graves v. People 
of State of New York ex rel. O‘Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 477 (1939) (―[G]overnment derives its 
authority wholly from powers delegated to it by the Constitution . . . .‖). 
 47. An article regarding the constitutionality of nation-building has yet to be found. As of 
September 29, 2008, a Westlaw search for journal articles with the terms ―nation building‖ and 
―constitution‖ in the title (TI(―nation build!‖ & constitution!) produced only four results. None 
of these results dealt with the constitutionality of nation-building. As of September 29, 2008, a 
Westlaw search for journal articles discussing the constitutionality of preventive war produced 
only ninety-five results with the search terms ((preempt! /s war) /p constitution!) and only 
eighteen results using the terms ―preventive war‖ /p constitution!. Generally, the few articles 
that mention the issue of the constitutionality of preventive war only address that a 
constitutional question exists before quickly passing an opinion of how that issue should be 
resolved. See, e.g., Ann Scales, Soft on Defense: The Failure to Confront Militarism, 20 
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 369, 376 (2005) (―Does the Legislative branch (or the 
Legislative and Executive branches acting together) have the power to authorize an unprovoked 
deployment of troops for the purpose of invading another country? I believe not, or at least 
believe there are excellent constitutional arguments to the contrary.‖). 
 Others frame a constitutional issue in terms of whether the President can unilaterally 
declare a preventive war. See, e.g., Mark R. Shulman & Lawrence J. Lee, The Debate Over War 
Powers, 30 HUM. RTS. 6 (2003) (―Because the president still does not acknowledge the 
constitutional limitations, and Congress has dodged the issue, at least about Iraq, it is important 
to recognize it and insist that the president must seek congressional approval for future 
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War‖: Is it Constitutional?, John B. Mitchell argues that preventive 
war, where a threat is not imminent, is not constitutional.
48
 After 
surveying the academic field, Mitchell explains that the current 
scholarship addressing the balance of power between the President 
and Congress in declaring war does not ―focus on whether or not the 
federal government—both the executive and the legislative 
branches—possesses the power to engage in preemptive war under 
the Constitution.‖49 Seeing nothing in the Constitution or surrounding 
literature that permits or prohibits preventive war, Mitchell turns to 
five categories of ―circumstantial evidence‖ to legitimize his claim 
that ―the federal government does not have the power under the 
Constitution to commit military force to preemptive war.‖50 
First, Mitchell argues that preventive war is at odds with the 
Lockean rationale underlying the social contract theory.
51
 The 
 
preemptive invasions.‖); Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT‘L L.J. 533 (2002) (examining whether the 
President must have the support of Congress to engage in preemptive strikes against other 
states); Mark J. Yost, Note, Self Defense or Presidential Pretext? The Constitutionality of 
Unilateral Preemptive Military Action, 78 GEO L.J. 415 (1989) (discussing when and how the 
President is to consult with Congress regarding a preemptive military action initiated by the 
President). 
 Most articles focus on international norms as a means of evaluation. See, e.g., Sean D. 
Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173, 177 (2004) (finding that the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq was not in accordance with international law); J. M. Spectar, Beyond the 
Rubicon: Presidential Leadership, International Law and the Use of Force in the Long Hard 
Slog, 22 CONN. J. INT‘L L. 47, 128 (2006) (stating that President Bush‘s leadership regarding 
Iraq undermined the U.N. system, marginalized the rule of international law, and significantly 
compromised world order). This mode of analysis is relevant to evaluating the policy itself, but 
does not directly address the constitutionality of the policy. 
 Only one article deals entirely with the issue of the constitutionality of preventive war. 
John B. Mitchell, ―Preemptive War‖: Is it Constitutional?, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 497 
(2004). Since this is the primary article available on the subject, its arguments will be discussed 
in detail. 
 48. Mitchell, supra note 47, at 525. Thus, with the distinction between preemption and 
prevention in mind, Mitchell argues that preemptive war is constitutional while preventive war 
is not. Id. at 500, 525; see supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
 49. Mitchell, supra note 47, at 503. 
 50. Id. at 504. Mitchell explains that ―[u]nder accepted principles of evidence and proof, 
circumstantial evidence has equal force to direct evidence,‖ and that the ―weight of 
circumstantial evidence legitimates the claim‖ that the federal government does not have the 
constitutional power to engage in preventive war. Id. 
 51. Id. According to Mitchell: 
The social contract theory postulated that back in the mists of time man lived in a state 
of nature where it was every man for himself . . . [where] each individual had ―natural 
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framers of the Constitution were guided by Locke‘s notions of natural 
law and based the Constitution ―on the belief that the citizenry had 
entered into a contract‖52 in which the federal government promised 
to ―provide for the common defence.‖53 Moreover, ―[t]he only 
enemies the founders may have envisioned were likely the European 
countries of the colonists‘ ancestry and heritage.‖54 Consequently, 
―military force under the constitutional structure should have been 
conceived as defensive in nature,‖55 and ―the power provided for the 
‗common defense‘ . . . was envisioned to be necessary to repel 
‗external attacks‘ (i.e., self-defense).‖56 Thus, ―an ‗imminent‘ threat 
is still the standard for the constitutional exercise of the power to use 
military force.‖57 
Second, Mitchell argues that preventive war would be antithetical 
to the framers‘ notion of a ―just war‖ and that ―the founders‘ view of 
war would have been circumscribed by the ‗just war‘ doctrine.‖58 
 
rights‖ revealed by their God-given ability to reason. But each man was his own law 
with respect to asserting and protecting these rights, with force being the final arbiter. 
In other words, man possessed a great deal of freedom, but not much security.  
 To gain security for their lives and property, people were willing to leave the state of 
nature, and with it, their previously unappealable right to be the ultimate law. Thus, 
one gave up the right to make the rules for day-to-day life, leaving that to a 
representative body which itself was subject to law. The law, not individual will, then 
ultimately decided all disputes. 
 Id. at 505 (citations omitted); see also JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1690). 
 52. Mitchell, supra note 47, at 506. 
 53. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. pmbl.). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. Mitchell derives this proposition from an excerpt of THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 
(Alexander Hamilton), which states that ―[t]he principle purposes to be answered by Union are 
these—The common defence of the members—the preservation of the public peace as well 
against internal convulsions as external attack.‖ Mitchell, supra note 47, at 506 n.43 (quoting 
THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 57. Mitchell, supra note 47, at 507.  
 58. Id. Mitchell explains that the just war doctrine contains six criteria for judging 
whether the resort to force is justified: (1) just cause, (2) competent authority, (3) right 
intention, (4) last resort, (5) probability of success, and (6) proportionality. Id. at 508. See also 
UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, THE HARVEST OF JUSTICE IS SOWN IN 
PEACE 13 (1993). These criteria derive from the writings of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. In 
the fourteenth century, Thomas Aquinas stated that only three requirements had to be met for a 
war to be considered just. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, in SOURCES OF THE WEST: 
READINGS IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION VOL. I, 184, 184 (Mark A. Kishlansky ed., 2003). The 
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Even though the world today faces many different dangers than it did 
at its founding, just cause ―still means that the ‗war is permissible 
only to confront a real national and certain danger‘ . . . . By 
definition, this principle cannot encompass preemptive war.‖59 
Third, Mitchell argues that preventive war is inconsistent with the 
founders‘ perspective on war.60 Having come out of a bloody war, the 
founders ―had no interest in granting the federal government the 
power to easily wage the country in war.‖61 The system created was 
intended to guard against rushing to war, making it ―hard to imagine 
that the founders would have given the federal government the power 
to make war on the grounds other than true ‗imminent‘ danger; i.e., 
traditional self-defense.‖62 Furthermore, allowing preventive war 
would have ―given the executive a rationale for constantly 
maintaining an army,‖ and the American citizens who had just fought 
to remove such a government ―were not about to fall under the heels 
of the same form of government, with the title ‗President‘ substituted 
for ‗King.‘‖63 
 
first of these was ―the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged.‖ 
Id. Aquinas derived this principle from Augustine who said that ―the natural order conducive to 
peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war should be in the hands 
of those who hold supreme authority.‖ Id. For a war to be just, Aquinas‘s second principle 
stated that a just cause was required, ―namely that those who are attacked, should be attacked 
because they deserve it on account of some fault. Id. Third, it was ―necessary that the 
belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good or the 
avoidance of evil.‖ Id. Again, Aquinas derived these principles from the words of Augustine, 
explaining that ―Augustine says: True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged 
not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, punishing 
evil-doers, and of uplifting the good.‖ Id.  
 59. Mitchell, supra note 47, at 508 (quoting National Conference of Bishops, Summary of 
the Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response, a Pastoral Letter on War and 
Peace (May 3, 1983), available at http://www.zero-nukes.org/challengeofpeace.pdf. 
 60. Id. at 509. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. Mitchell also points to the serious debate that occurred during the War of 1812 as 
to whether the federal government had the power to cross the border into Canada as part of the 
nation‘s defense. Id. at 509–10. Although the ―question was eventually answered in the 
affirmative and, the U.S. attacked Canada,‖ the debate showed ―how strongly those in the new 
nation perceived the use of military force as tied to true self-defense.‖ Id. at 510. 
 63. Id. at 511. In 1848, Abraham Lincoln discussed this issue in a letter to William 
Herndon: 
Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation whenever he shall deem it 
necessary to repel an invasion, and you allow him to do so whenever he may choose to 
say he deems it necessary for such purpose, and you allow him to make war at 
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pleasure. Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect, after having 
given him so much as you propose. If to-day he should choose to say he thinks it 
necessary to invade Canada to prevent the British from invading us, how could you 
stop him? You may say to him,—―I see no probability of the British invading us‖; but 
he will say to you, ―Be silent: I see it, if you don‘t.‖ 
 The provision of the Constitution giving the war making power to Congress was 
dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons: kings had always been involving 
and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the 
good of the people was the object. This our convention understood to be the most 
oppressive of all kingly oppressions, and they resolved to so frame the Constitution 
that no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us. But your 
view destroys the whole matter, and places our President where kings have always 
stood. 
Letter from Abraham Lincoln to William H. Herndon (Feb. 15, 1848), in THE WRITINGS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN VOL. 2, 18, 18 (Arthur Brooks ed., 1923), available at http://www.classic-
literature.co.uk/american-authors/19th-century/abraham-lincoln/the-writings-of-abraham-lincoln-
02/ebook-page-18.asp. 
 Note that this analysis, although it discusses the war power in terms of a preventive attack, 
still is focused on where the war power lies, that is, whether the President has the power to act 
without Congress. Although this is an important question, it is a different question from 
whether the Constitution permits preventive wars because a preventive war can conceivably be 
―properly‖ declared under the constitutional war-power structure. In other words, before 
analyzing the constitutional procedure for declaring a preventive war, one should address 
whether the Constitution allows such a war to be waged in the first place. For discussion on the 
war powers, see generally JOHN H. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL 
LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1996); Raoul Berger, War-Making by the 
President, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 29 (1972); Henry P. Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 
B.U. L. REV. 19 (Special Issue 1970); Leonard G. Ratner, The Coordinated Warmaking 
Power—Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Roles, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 461 (1971); John C. 
Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War 
Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996); Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit 
Forces to Combat, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1771 (1968); Sarah M. Riley, Comment, Constitutional 
Crisis or Déjà vu? The War Power, the Bush Administration and the War on Terror, 45 DUQ. 
L. REV. 701 (2007). See also Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1316, 1319 (1973) (holding 
that Article I, § 8, cl. 11 gives only Congress the power to declare war); Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (explaining that the President does not have 
unlimited power over persons and property of citizens which will justify him in ordering seizure 
of private property simply because it may be useful or beneficial to the Armed Forces); 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 92 (1943) (holding that the principal war powers of 
the President arise from the President‘s position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces); 
Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 10 (1942) (stating that the Constitution invests the President with 
the power to wage war which Congress has declared, and to carry into effect all laws passed by 
Congress for the government and regulation of the Armed Forces); Matthews v. McStea, 91 
U.S. (1 Otto) 7, 12 (1875) (explaining that the President has the power to recognize the 
existence of a state of war); United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623, 627 (1871) 
(stating that the public danger must be immediate, imminent, and impending before the 
government can seize private property useful to the Armed Forces); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 
Black) 635, 659 (1862) (holding that the President has no legal power to initiate or declare 
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Fourth, Mitchell argues that permitting preventive war risks 
permanent alteration to the basic constitutional structure.
64
 Pointing 
to recent Tenth Amendment jurisprudence,
65
 Mitchell contends that 
―the federal government faces the limits of its powers when its 
actions threaten a permanent alteration of the basic constitutional 
structure.‖66 Thus, the concern remains that ―excessive federal 
encroachment into matters affecting the states risks erosion of state 
sovereignty, and with it, the basic federalist constitutional 
structure.‖67 Should preventive war become legitimized, a dominating 
federal government would result where states and civilians 
―principally exist to endlessly support the federal military-industrial 
complex . . . . [T]he federalist conception reflected in the 
constitutional structure of American government would exist only in 
the most diluted form . . . .‖68 
 
war); O‘Neal v. United States, 140 F.2d 908, 912 (6th Cir. 1944) (explaining that Congress may 
invoke the action of the executive branch so long as it is not an assumption of its own 
constitutional field of action); Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34, 36 (D.D.C. 1999) 
(holding that if the President fails to report to Congress within forty-eight hours of introducing 
troops into hostilities, the court may order that the report be filed or the troops be withdrawn 
sixty days after the report was filed or required to be filed); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 
893 (D.D.C. 1982); Perkins v. Rogers, 35 Ind. 124, 167 (1871) (stating that the President cannot 
initiate or declare war against a foreign nation or a domestic state); 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (2000) 
(stating that the constitutional powers of the President to introduce United States Armed Forces 
into hostilities are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war; (2) specific statutory 
authorization; or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its 
territories or possessions, or its armed forces); 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (2000) (stating that the 
President must consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into 
hostilities); 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a) (2000) (stating that when troops are introduced in the absence 
of a declaration of war, the President must submit a written report within forty-eight hours to 
the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate); 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) 
(2000) (stating that the President must terminate the use of Armed Forces after sixty days 
unless Congress declares war, extends the sixty-day period at a maximum of thirty days, or is 
unable to meet because of an armed attack on the United States). 
 64. Mitchell, supra note 47, at 511. 
 65. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995). According to these cases, ―an enumerated power given to the federal government to 
benefit the federal-republic . . . [cannot] constitutionally be employed in a manner actually 
tending to erode that same federal republic (i.e., weaken the federal state relationship embodied 
in the concept of federalism).‖ Mitchell, supra note 47, at 511. 
 66. Mitchell, supra note 47, at 511. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 513. 
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Fifth, Mitchell argues that prior to the attack on Iraq, the United 
States never engaged in preventive war.
69
 While numerous rationales 
have been given to justify the use of force by the United States,
70
 
preventive war has never been attempted as a rationale for using 
force.
71
 Accordingly, ―[i]f America creates a precedent through its 
practice . . . . [a]ny state that believes another regime poses a possible 
future threat—regardless of the evidence—could cite the United 
States invasion of Iraq.‖72 These five factors lead Mitchell to 
conclude that preventive war is not a constitutional military policy.
73
 
B. The Constitutionality of Preventive War: Problems with Mitchell’s 
Approach 
The lack of scholarship on the issue of the constitutionality of 
preventive war may be indicative of a belief that the Constitution 
simply does not address the issue of preventive war. Before 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 514–16. Over the past two hundred years, the United States has given a variety 
of rationales to justify force, including protection of U.S. citizens and property (e.g., Haiti 
1915–1934; Nicaragua 1912; Panama 1903, 1989; Grenada 1983; Lebanon 1957); preventing 
chaos when local governments could no longer maintain order (i.e., Florida in the early 1800s, 
Panama and the Dominican Republic in the early twentieth century); rescuing U.S. hostages 
(i.e., Iran 1980); upholding the Monroe Doctrine by sending troops to nations incapable of 
keeping foreign powers out of the Western Hemisphere (i.e., Cuba 1906); responding to a 
foreign state that sponsored terrorism resulting in the death of American citizens in Europe (i.e., 
Libya in the 1980s); restoring governments to power in the Western Hemisphere (i.e., Haiti 
1994); upholding a neutrality obligation of a treaty (i.e., Panama 1903); preserving the status 
quo while negotiating for the annex of foreign-held territory in North America (i.e., Florida in 
the early 1800s); pursuing pirates, bandits, and outlaws (i.e., Pancho Villa into Mexico, 
Seminoles into Florida, Noriega into Panama); protecting U.S. military personnel (i.e., 
responding to Cambodian attack on U.S. naval ship Mayaquez in 1975); responding to hostility 
while providing humanitarian aid (i.e., El Salvador 1984); preventing nations from preying on 
U.S. shipping and commerce (i.e., Tripoli 1802, Algiers 1815, War of 1812, World War I); 
responding to nations that have invaded disputed territory claimed to have been annexed by the 
United States (i.e., Mexican War 1846); responding to an attack on U.S. naval bases (i.e., Pearl 
Harbor); responding to a nation intertwined with terrorists who attacked U.S. soil (i.e., 
Afghanistan 2001); responding to a nation that refused to leave its colony and declared war on 
the United States (i.e., Spanish-American War 1898); and upholding a regional or bilateral 
defense pact (Vietnam and the SEATO mutual defense pact, Kosovo and NATO), treaty 
obligation (Vietnam and the 1954 Geneva Accord), and U.N. membership (Korea 1950, Iraq 
1991, Somalia 1993). Id. 
 71. Id. at 516. 
 72. Id. at 517–18. 
 73. Id. at 525. 
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beginning his discussion, Mitchell concedes that there is a lack of 
direct textual or case material on the issue.
74
 His discussion thereafter 
is based on a principle of evidence law that circumstantial evidence 
has equal force to direct evidence.
75
 From the outset, it is 
questionable whether this notion of evidence law applies to 
constitutional analysis.
76
 If one assumes it does, he or she must then 
evaluate the weight of the circumstantial evidence presented by 
Mitchell.  
1. Is Preventive War at Odds with the Social Contract Theory? 
Although the federal government was formed based on the social 
contract principles of John Locke, and part of that Lockean bargain 
was to provide for the common defense,
77
 it is unclear why the 
―philosophical roots of that bargain . . . would unlikely construe the 
‗common defense‘ to include any notion of ‗preemptive‘ defense.‖78 
Mitchell begins with the presumption that ―imminence‖ is a 
constitutional standard that limits the federal government in going to 
war.
79
 Unfortunately, he provides no support for this notion. 
Moreover, the Constitution itself does not give any criteria of 
imminence that must be present before the United States can go to 
war. If imminence were a deciding factor, one might question the 
constitutionality of U.S. involvement in such places as Haiti, 
Somalia, or Kosovo, where it is questionable that a U.S. interest was 
in ―imminent‖ danger.80 
Furthermore, it is unclear why the Lockean social contract 
philosophy would not include preventive attacks because ―[t]he great 
and chief end therefore, of Mens [sic] uniting into Commonwealths, 
 
 74. Mitchell, supra note 47, at 504.  
 75. Id. 
 76. See, e.g., United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 311 n.7 (1998) (―It would be an odd 
inversion of our hierarchy of laws if altering or interpreting a rule of evidence worked a 
corresponding change in the meaning of the Constitution.‖). 
 77. See Mitchell, supra note 47, at 506. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. at 507. 
 80. Using force in humanitarian aid missions would also be problematic if imminence is 
to be used as a constitutional standard. Similarly, construing the ―common defense‖ as a (the) 
rationale for the United States to use force would severely limit military operations abroad, 
including humanitarian efforts where America is not acting for the common defense.  
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and putting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of 
their Property.‖81 Finally, ―whoever has the Legislative or Supream 
[sic] Power of any Common-wealth, is bound . . . to imploy [sic] the 
force of the Community at home, only in the Execution of such Laws, 
or abroad to prevent or redress Foreign Injuries, and secure the 
Community from Inroads and Invasion.‖82 
2. Does Just War Theory Enter the Constitutional Calculation? 
While the founders perhaps were ―persons whose Lockean 
political philosophy and Christian religious conceptions were 
intellectually intertwined,‖83 it is unclear that this should affect a 
constitutional analysis, since the Constitution mentions no criteria for 
going to war justly. Rather, the Constitution outlines a procedure for 
legitimizing war. Hence, in analyzing the constitutionality of a 
warfare policy, one would examine whether it could be executed 
according to the requirements of the Constitution.
84
 Accordingly, the 
Christian just war theory should not enter the constitutional 
calculation. 
3. Did the Founders Limit the Reasons for War? 
Undoubtedly, the founders wished to fight wars out of necessity 
and avoid them if possible;
85
 however, their way of preventing hasty 
wars was through a constitutional system involving a process for 
declaring war.
86
 The Constitution nowhere explains the criteria 
necessary for going to war or the terms of war. It merely explains the 
procedure necessary for making the determination to declare war.
87
 
While the preamble does hint that war should be fought to ―provide 
 
 81. LOCKE, supra note 51, at 350–51. 
 82. Id. at 353 (emphasis added). 
 83. Mitchell, supra note 47, at 507. 
 84. This is not to say that just war considerations should not be made in analyzing the 
wisdom of a warfare policy. For a discussion of Christian Just War Doctrine, see supra note 58 
and accompanying text. See also JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, JUST WAR AGAINST TERROR: THE 
BURDEN OF AMERICAN POWER IN A VIOLENT WORLD (2003); PETER S. TEMES, THE JUST WAR: 
AN AMERICAN REFLECTION ON THE MORALITY OF WAR IN OUR TIME (2003). 
 85. Mitchell, supra note 47, at 509; see also Yoo, supra note 63, at 190, 263. 
 86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 87. Id. 
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for the common defense,‖88 the rationale of preventive war is not 
inconsistent with this notion.
89
 The Constitution requires 
congressional approval of war
90
 to prevent a President from acting 
like a king and to let the American people at any given time decide 
for what they wish to fight. For example, the debate by early 
Americans as to whether Canada could be invaded
91
 shows not a 
constitutional question being played out, but rather a policy debate as 
to whether the nation should use a particular method to fight a war. 
Hence, the Constitution prevents a President from becoming a 
dictator and gives the American people the power
92
 to decide whether 
and why to go to war.
93
 
4. Is the Federalist Structure Threatened at the Expense of the 
Constitution? 
It is unclear how preventive war risks the basic federalist 
constitutional structure any more than any other rationale given for 
going to war. Mitchell provides a scenario in which preventive war 
becomes acceptable and the United States becomes engaged in 
endless actions from Afghanistan to Iraq, Iraq to Syria, Syria to Iran, 
Iran to Somalia, Somalia to North Korea, and on until ―society‘s 
almost exclusive focus becomes the current war,‖ resulting in a 
dominating federal government.
94
 While this sounds horrible, the 
same endless war scenario could equally apply to repeated U.S. 
military engagements that seek to provide humanitarian aid, enforce a 
treaty, act in accordance with the U.N., protect U.S. commerce 
abroad, or prevent regional instability—all of which have been held 
to be ―valid‖ rationales for the use of American military force in the 
 
 88. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 89. Arguably, it would be in the common defense to strike a nuclear facility based on 
intelligence that a weapon was being made to be used against America, even though no weapon 
had yet been made. 
 90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 91. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 92. In this context, the American people act through their representatives. 
 93. This system likely accounts for the numerous rationales given for using force in 
American history. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 94. Mitchell, supra note 47, at 512–13. 
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past.
95
 In order for the federal government to continue with military 
action, the people would have to continuously approve of them, and 
in doing so would preserve the federalist structure.
96
 Additionally, 
such a nightmare scenario is constitutionally possible so long as the 
constitutional procedures are met. Thus, the Constitution limits the 
method of declaring war and leaves it to the people to decide if they 
want a dominating federal government to develop out of continued 
military engagements. 
5. Do Past Justifications and Other Countries‘ Actions Affect a 
Constitutional Analysis? 
It is unclear whether the United States has ever engaged in 
preventive war.
97
 Even if it had, however, it would not make 
preventive war any more or less constitutional since every rationale 
given for war was at one time never before used by the United States. 
Furthermore, it may be true that fighting preventive wars will create a 
precedent for other countries to engage in similar action; however, 
this does not make preventive war unconstitutional. For instance, 
during World War II, the United States established internment camps 
for Americans of Japanese descent and the Supreme Court held that 
this action by the President was constitutional.
98
 Under Mitchell‘s 
logic, any nation could put a certain group of its citizens in camps 
and point to the U.S. decision for legal justification. Such an action 
by another nation, while it may reveal the serious faults of the 
American policy, does not automatically make the American policy 
unconstitutional. 
 
 95. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 96. It is more likely, however, that the people would not approve of continuous military 
adventures as exemplified by the decreasing amount of support for the war in Iraq. See, for 
example, a CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll, Jan. 14–17, 2008, http://www.polling 
report.com/iraq.htm?loc=interstitialskip, in which 34% of respondents said they favored the 
U.S. war in Iraq, 63% said they opposed the war in Iraq, and 3% were unsure. 
 97. See MUELLER, supra note 7, at 18, app. A. The authors explain that during the Cold 
War, the United States was ready to take military action for preventive purposes against the 
Soviet Union from 1945–55, during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, and to prevent China 
from acquiring nuclear weapons in 1963–64. Id. Additionally, the authors characterize the 
American invasion of Grenada in 1983 as an act of preventive force resulting in regime change. 
Id.  
 98. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/15
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  All for the Sake of Democratization 531 
 
 
C. The Constitutionality of Post-Conflict Nation-Building 
Questions regarding the constitutionality of nation-building arise 
less than questions on the constitutionality of preventive war.
99
 Given 
the long history of American nation-building that stems from 
America‘s founding, however, the use of the U.S. military to rebuild 
war-torn nations is seemingly constitutional. If the absence of 
preventive war throughout American history may be used as evidence 
of its unconstitutionality,
100
 surely the repeated use of nation-building 
since the country‘s founding supports its constitutionality. The long 
history of nation-building in and by America supports the conclusion 
that the Framers of the Constitution would have understood nation-
building to be simply a part of war. If nation-building is considered 
an extension of war, then, so long as that war is entered into 
according to the constitutional procedure, it is constitutional.
101
 
Additionally, even if one holds that war may only be constitutionally 
waged to ―provide for the common defense,‖102 post-combat nation-
building efforts that seek to provide American security should not 
offend the Constitution.
103
 Ultimately, the use of nation-building is 
less a constitutional question and more a policy question.  
III. THE WISDOM OF THE CURRENT WARFARE POLICY  
The Constitution merely establishes a system to follow when 
declaring war. That system gives the people a voice in deciding what 
reasons are sufficient to send troops into battle and how long to 
remain once the fighting has ended.
104
 The use of preventive war, for 
 
 99. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 100. See Mitchell, supra note 47, at 513–19. 
 101. The Constitution does not explain or dictate how to fight a war. See supra note 89 and 
accompanying text. 
 102. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 103. This rationale for nation-building emerged after September 11, 2001. See supra notes 
8, 39 and accompanying text. 
 104. As Secretary of State Dean Acheson put it in dismissing the need to articulate a legal 
justification for U.S. actions during the Cuban missile crisis:  
The power, position and prestige of the United States had been challenged by another 
state; and law simply does not deal with such questions of ultimate power—power that 
comes close to the sources of sovereignty. I cannot believe that there are principles of 
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example in the case of Iraq, can comply with that system.
105
 Still, a 
policy can be both constitutional and unwise.
106
 Though the current 
warfare policy appears to be constitutional, a question remains 
whether it is a sound policy.  
A. The Wisdom of Preventive War 
Mitchell‘s arguments, while not supporting a constitutional 
challenge to preventive war, reveal the implications and policy 
weaknesses of preventive war.
107
 Besides the potential harm to 
America and the world that Mitchell describes, others argue that 
preventive attacks are also ―ineffective, costly, unnecessary, and 
potentially even counterproductive.‖108 Historically, attacks have 
been made against targets that were not likely to acquire weapons of 
mass destruction.
109
 Underlying these episodes is poor intelligence 
about a target‘s weapons program.110 If America is going to have a 
solid preventive war policy, it must first have a system of reliable 
intelligence.
111
 Moreover, it has become more difficult to strike a 
 
law that say we must accept destruction of our way of life . . . . The survival of states is 
not a matter of law.  
Dean Acheson, Remarks at the Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 57th 
Annual Meeting 13–15 (1963), in INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 108 (Robert J. Beck et al. eds., 1996). 
 105. See Riley, supra note 63, at 733. (―[T]he conflict in Iraq is within the constitutional 
bounds of President Bush‘s power as Commander in Chief . . . . Congress authorized a pre-
emptive war against Iraq. The policy debate . . . is an important and necessary debate, but it has 
no effect on Bush‘s essential constitutional authority to conduct such a war.‖). 
 106. Internment camps during World War II are an example of a constitutional policy that 
many would consider unwise. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.  
 107. Rather than discuss each point again, Mitchell‘s previous arguments will be adopted 
and presumed valid policy considerations against the use of preventive war. 
 108. DAN REITER, PREVENTIVE WAR AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: THE LESSONS OF HISTORY 2 
(2006). 
 109. Id. at 3. For example, a series of attacks was launched against the nuclear program of 
Nazi Germany, though scientific and other error likely would have prevented Germany from 
building a nuclear device in the time available. Id. The 1998 missile attacks against chemical 
weapons facilities in Sudan also made little difference and the evidence associating the 
installation with chemical weapons was quite weak. Id. The 1993 and 1998 cruise missile 
strikes against Iraqi targets were also aimed at a dormant weapons of mass destruction program. 
Id. 
 110. Id.  
 111. As Greg Thielmann, former head of the Office of Strategic Proliferation and Military 
Affairs in the State Department‘s Office of Intelligence and Research said, ―The effectiveness 
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weapons facility because of the anticipation of and precautionary 
moves made by the target.
112
 
Furthermore, while there may be long-term benefits to preventive 
wars in which regime change is the goal,
113
 these engagements come 
at a large cost. First, American casualties are unavoidable and 
military assets are drawn away from other priorities.
114
 Second, 
preventive wars can reduce the number of people that volunteer for 
military service.
115
 Third, regime-change operations are expensive 
and current estimates state that the Iraq war has cost over $1 
trillion.
116
 Finally, preventive wars have the potential to stimulate 
terrorism, the very thing they are designed to prevent.
117
 Accordingly, 
because it is unlikely that any potential benefits would outweigh 
 
of any first-strike military doctrine depends on reliable intelligence. The U.S. intelligence 
community‘s inability to produce accurate information on enemy threats renders such a doctrine 
feckless and reckless.‖ Id. at 4 (quoting Greg Thielmann, Preventive Military Intervention: The 
Role of Intelligence, Ridgway Center Policy Brief 04-01 (October 2004)).  
 112. Ever since the Israeli attack against the Iraqi Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981, states 
with weapons programs ―have been much more aware of the possibility of being the target of a 
preventive attack‖ and have ―taken steps to reduce the vulnerability of their [weapons] 
programs by hardening facilities, building duplicate facilities, and keeping the existence and 
location of facilities secret.‖ REITER, supra note 108, at 4–6. 
 113. These long term benefits could include stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and adding another peaceful democratic member to the international community. Id. 
at 7. 
 114. Id. at 8. In May 2005, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote in a classified 
report to Congress that the Iraq War had limited the ability of the military to fight in other 
conflicts due to depleted stockpile of weapons, stress on reserve units, and other factors. Id. 
(citing Thom Shanker, Iraq Role Military Ability, Congress Is Told, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2005, 
at A1). 
 115. REITER, supra note 108, at 9. ―In the fiscal year ending September 30, 2005, the Army 
missed its recruiting goals, achieving only 84 percent of the enlistment goal for the Reserve, 80 
percent for the National Guard, and 92 percent of the active duty forces.‖ Id. (citing Tony Perry, 
Marines Hit Recruiting Goal, Won’t Lower Bar, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2005, at A-30). 
 116. Tyler Cowen, What Does Iraq Cost? Even More than You Think, WASH. POST, Nov. 
18, 2007, at B03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/ 
16/AR2007111600865.html; David Leonhardt, What $1.2 Trillion Can Buy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
17, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/17/ business/17leonhardt.html.  
 117. REITER, supra note 108, at 10. This can happen in four ways: (1) use of force can 
increase global anti-Americanism, which may increase the motivation of some individuals to 
join terrorist groups; (2) U.S. troops abroad may create targets of opportunity for terrorists; (3) 
preventive attacks open the door for insurgency wars, effectively generating training 
opportunities for terrorist organizations; and (4) even if regime change does occur, the state 
may be overrun by chaos and disorder, allowing terrorists and rogue elements to seize material 
useful for producing weapons. Id. at 10–11. 
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these risks, engaging in preventive war is not in the best interest of 
the United States. 
B. The Wisdom of Nation-Building After Combat Has Ended 
The question of how long the United States should remain 
rebuilding a nation after combat has ended is a political question left 
to the people. What the citizens decide, however, makes a statement 
to the world.
118
 Thus, half-hearted efforts at nation-building increase 
tension and weaken the policy goals behind post-conflict nation-
building. If nation-building is to be effective, it must be carried out 
fully. If the people do not wish to be engaged in another nation for so 
long, then nation-building should be removed as a component of 
warfare policy so as not to prolong American intervention abroad. 
Ultimately, once a war has started, the United States should 
engage in post-conflict nation-building. Critics observe that 
―outsiders can never build nations.‖119 This criticism, however, fails 
to make a distinction between two very different aspects of nation-
building. The first aspect involves creating or fixing the cultural, 
social, and historical ties that bind a nation
120—a task that indeed is 
difficult for outsiders to accomplish. What critics overlook, however, 
is the second aspect, which might be more appropriately named state-
building. This refers to creating or strengthening government 
institutions such as armies, police forces, judiciaries, central banks, 
tax-collection agencies, and health and education systems.
121
 State-
building has two very separate yet critical phases. The first phase 
―involves stabilizing the country, offering humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief, rebuilding the infrastructure, and jump-starting the 
economy.‖122 After stability has been achieved, the second phase 
begins, which ―consists of creating self-sustaining political and 
 
 118. Hence, in 1998, Osama bin Laden stated, ―We have seen in the last decade the decline 
of the American government and the weakness of the American soldier, who was ready to wage 
cold wars and unprepared to fight long wars.‖ Garrick Utley, CNN Saturday Morning News: Is 
bin Laden’s Mindset Similar to Hitler’s?, CNN.COM/ TRANSCRIPTS, Dec. 8, 2001, http:// 
transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0112/08/smn.15.html.  
 119. Fukuyama, supra note 42, at 159. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. 
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economic institutions that will ultimately permit competent 
democratic governance and economic growth.‖123 It is this aspect of 
nation-building, that is, state-building, in which outsiders can become 
involved and in which America should become involved once combat 
has ended. 
Thus, if America is to intervene militarily in another nation, 
America must remain after major combat has ended to rebuild that 
nation. Nation-building has become an essential aspect of U.S. 
foreign policy in order not only to promote democracy abroad, but to 
ensure security at home. The history of nation-building has been a 
mixed bag of both failure and success.
124
 It is in the national interests 
of the United States to learn from both the good and the bad 
experiences, and to continue its nation-building efforts. America must 
recognize the strategic value of nation-building and work to change 
the current system into one that is fully prepared, equipped, trained, 
and patient enough to deal with the long, difficult, costly, yet crucial 
task of building nations. Thus, in accordance with the pottery store 
rule,
125
 and in the interests of national security, the United States 
should help rebuild nations after combat has ended. 
IV. A WARFARE POLICY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
While preventive war may be a constitutional warfare policy, it 
does not appear to be a sound policy. Although there may be some 
long-term benefits, these are greatly outweighed by the short-term 
and long-term costs as well as the uncertainty of success. 
Accordingly, the United States should utilize other policies to deal 
with potential threats to national security. Rather than rushing to war 
to prevent a future attack, the United States should focus its policy on 
other areas including, ―diplomacy, deterrence, ballistic missile 
defense, and . . . counterterrorism polices . . . likely to be more 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.  
 125. See Thomas L. Friedman, Present at . . . What?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2003. The rule 
is an expression in foreign policy circles that if ―you break it, you own it.‖ Id. In other words, if 
a nation causes turmoil in another nation, the nation that caused the trouble must deal with the 
problem itself. 
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effective at containing the spread and use of [weapons of mass 
destruction] and less costly in human lives.‖126 
Additionally, for the United States to be more effective and 
efficient at nation-building, several military and political changes 
must take place. First, several changes must be made within the 
military. Fighting an insurgency and keeping peace are operations 
that involve manpower that the United States currently lacks.
127
 
Furthermore, because the troops that are available are not trained for 
irregular warfare, the United States military needs a restructuring in 
its training. Veterans of combat explain ―that it is easier for troops 
trained for high-intensity combat to deal with peacekeeping than it is 
for peacekeepers to deal with high-intensity combat.‖128 Accordingly, 
some call for ―high-quality general-purpose forces that can shoot 
terrorists one minute and hand out candy to children the next.‖129  
While one solution would be to have current branches of the 
military trained in both conventional warfare and nation-building 
tactics, an ideal solution would be to create a new division of 
specially trained ―nation-builders‖ that would enter a nation 
alongside an occupying military force once traditional combat has 
ended. Perhaps a new branch of the military could be created, tasked 
with post-combat nation-building and trained more heavily in police 
tactics and civilian control than conventional combat. As the 
branches do now, this new branch could work alongside the current 
branches in post-combat settings to secure peace in a region. 
Second, whatever changes occur in the military realm, changes in 
political institutions are also essential to an effective nation-building 
policy. The United States should create a ―government agency 
specifically tasked with rebuilding war-torn lands in cooperation with 
international agencies, allied governments, and nongovernmental 
 
 126. REITER, supra note 108, at 2. 
 127. See Max Boot, The Struggle to Transform the Military, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 103, 107 
(2005) (―[C]ontrolling a civilian population requires using soldiers to patrol the streets like cops 
on the beat, and the United States does not have nearly enough of them.‖). Boot proposes that 
the number of troops in the Armed Forces should be increased by at least 100,000. Id. at 108. 
He suggests possible cuts to help this expenditure, such as cutbacks on the F-22 fighter, 
national missile defense, and the Virginia-class submarine, which would free up nearly $205 
billion. Id. 
 128. Id. at 108. 
 129. Id.  
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organizations.‖130 Such an agency, however, should not allow the 
military to remain unchanged, and both military and political 
reorganization is essential for successful nation-building efforts in the 
future. 
These structural changes are necessary for successful nation-
building, which should be part of the military policy of the United 
States. While quick wars in which America invades, fights, wins, and 
exits are attractive, they ultimately leave political vacuums, do not 
serve the interests of the United States, and create problems for future 
generations. Therefore, although preventive wars should be removed 
from America‘s warfare policy, post-conflict nation-building should 
be included as a necessary element of America‘s warfare policy in 
the twenty-first century. 
CONCLUSION 
The current American warfare policy includes waging preventive 
wars and rebuilding war-torn nations when combat has ended. These 
two aspects of America‘s current policy are not contrary to the 
Constitution. This conclusion, however, does not automatically make 
these two facets of modern warfare wise. Preventive war is not a 
sound policy because of its short-term and long-term costs combined 
with the uncertainty of success. Once a war has started, however, it is 
in America‘s best interest to remain after combat has ended and 
rebuild the nation. Accordingly, the United States should focus its 
warfare policy away from preventive attacks and more on other 
methods of dealing with future threats, such as diplomacy, 
deterrence, and counterterrorism. Furthermore, America should 
restructure military and political institutions in order to become more 
efficient and effective at post-conflict nation-building. By doing this, 
America will enter the twenty-first century with a warfare policy that 
is constitutional, practical, effective, and wise. 
 
 130. Id. at 111. Boot says that such an agency would help America ―to be better prepared 
the next time—and yes, there will be a next time.‖ Id. Still ―[n]o matter how much civilian 
management improves, the bulk of the manpower for any nation-building assignment would 
still have to come from the Pentagon.‖ Id.  
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